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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
LAWRENCE BUTTERFIELD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

DONALD G. CHANEY,

Case
No. 9413

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Flamtiff-Respondent and Defendant-Appel!ant entered ~nto a contract in August of 1959 for
\be la.ndscapi:1g of Appellant's home, the construction JT o. ~atio, and retaining wall. Contract price
Na.s to De $893.00. Said agreement was signed on
lQ August 1959, and immediately thereafter Respondent began v10rk on the above-listed project. A short
time after the signing of the contract, Appellant extended the ccntract to Respondent to include the
construction of a cement cinder-block wall at the
agreed price of $1,000.00. Subsequent to this, a
further extension was entered into for the constructicn of certam planter boxes running adjacent to
the cement cinder-block wall.
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Respondent completed the work outlined wilh
the final capping of the cement wall in December
of 1959. The lawn was planted approximately Octo
ber 25, 1959, and failed to grow the following year.
Appellant alleged that such failure was due to the
poor workmanship of the Respondent, and Respon.
dent alleged that it was due to the failure to water
on the part of Appellant.
Appellant paid Respondent $1,000.00. There was
a balance due on the contract of $893.00. At pre- trial,
Respondent admitted that the cement patio was not
in excellent condition, as there was admittedly 3
slight flaking of the top. Said matter having been
admitted, no evidence to the contrary, the tnal
court allowed an offset against the contract price of
$50.00.
During the construction and completion of th9
above contract, Respondent was not a licens2d con
tractor, as required by the provision of 58-23-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. The trial court held, how·
ever, that Respondent came under the provisions
of 58-23-2(6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, an ex·
ception to the requirement for a contractor's license
in that this was a contract of less than $1000.00 value,
and as such was incidental and did not require that
Respondent be licensed.
It is from this decision that Appellant appeals
to this Honorable Court.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
EXCEPTION OF 58-23-2(6) APPLIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE.

It has been uniformly held and appears to be
the gene:;:-al law that where a license is required for
t!ie carrying on of a business, that failure to obtain
such license will make any contract entered into
v.J1d and unenforceable. This general law appears
ir 53 CJS, Section 59, p. 711:
"A contract entered into by a person in the
course of an occupation or business in which he
is engaged without taking out a license or paying
the license fee or tax as required by law is void
and unenforceable where the statute or ordnance
expressly vidiates such contracts or where it expressly prohibits the carryinl{ on of such occupation or busir>!!ss without a license, permit or approval, or the payment of the tax even though it
does not expressly declare such contracts to be
void." (Emphasis added)

The general law, as outlined above, applies
specifically to the situation covered by this appeal.
Respondent was a contractor and was engaged to
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perform construction work by the Appella t h .
. Th R
i
.
n e,e.
m.
; ~sponaent did i:iot possess a valid C~ntractor s License, as provided by the statut . ·
e, Jnr·
as sue h any contract entered into by Respo d ~
· vo1'd an d unenforceable.
n en,
is
See Eklund v Elwell, 116, U 521, 211 P2d 84~·
Olsen v Reese, 114 U 411, 200 P2d 733.
·
Under the provisions of 58-23-3(3), Utah Coss
Annotated, 1953, wherein the word "contractor" is
defined, it states that
"any person, who for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage, or other compensation other than wages,
undertakes with another for the construction, alter·
a ti on, repair, addition to, or improvement of any
building, highway, road, railroad, excavation, or
othe rstructure, project, development or improvement other than to personalty or any part there·
of; ... "

The provisions of this statute are clearly regula·
tory and of a police nature to protect the publ:c
from unqualified contractors and are used as a
means of regulation by the State. Appellant al·
leges that had the work been satisfactory to him
it would not have been necessary for him to reb
upon the protection of said statute; that Appellar.1
paid the Respondent for that work which was satls·
factory and at the agreed price, and had clearlv
shown his good faith in relying on the Respondent's
ability as a contractor. However, when the work
covered by the contract was not satisfactory, Appell::i.nt found it necessary to rely on the protection
afforded him by the statutes of this State.
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The contract entered into by the parties hereto
was for the general beautification and improvement
Jf the Appello.nt's land. Respondent held himself
out to be a qualified and bona fide contractor with
the r_ecessary equipment and ability. Appellant alleged that Respondent was not such, and that his
mabihty -v,wrked a hardship on Appellant in that
Aop2llant was required to obtain services of anotho: qi_;_a~ifie:::l. and licensed contractor to rectify the
work improperiy done under this contract.
lt is, therefore, the contention of the Appellant
tha+ it was an error on the part of the court to uphold
his contract in that it should have been declared
void and unenforceable.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
EXCEPTION OF 58-23-2(6) APPLIES.

Section 58-23-2(6), Utah Code Annotated/ 1953.
orovides that no license is required if:
"on one undertaking or project by contracts or contract performed directly or indirectly by one contractor, the aggregate contract price for which, for
labor, materials and all other items is less than
$1.000.00 such work or operations being considered
as of a casual, minor, or inconsequential nature."
(Emphasis added)

The court erred in h9lding that Respondent fell
1·rHhin the provisions of)hJ9 ex~eption.

From a reading of the above-cited provision of
the TJtah Code Annotated, it is clear that this appeal
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must necessarily revolve itself around this Court'
definition of the terms "undertaking" and "project.~
It is clear from the evidence that a contract was
entered into and modified twice. All of the wor~
covered by the contract and modifications were Ji.
ter-related in that they were all part and parcel of the
beautification and improvement of Appellant's land.
The contract was signed April 10th and was extend
ed a short time later.
This agreement, in aggregate, was well over
$1,000.00, and, therefore, the only exception which
possibly could be allowed would be that this ls
more than one project or undertaking.

A careful search of the legislative history fai'.s
to indicate what the intent of the legislature was as
to what was to constitute one "undertaking" or
"project." Further no clear definition has been extended by any court of competent jurisdiction in
this state or any neighboring state, and there ap·
pears to be a dearth of authority in this area of th~
law.
The question. therefore, becomes one of d~
termininq what is meant in this statute bv the w~rd
"project." The work agreed upon by the part:es
· and 1111· ,
hereto was for the general lan dscapmg
,
d Respondent ·
provement of Appellant s groun 5 ·
h'l
1
agreed to the contract, began his work, and w ~
still on the premises with equipment and .~en.an
proceeding as agreed, was extended mod1ficatrons ,
which related to the contract. All of the workdwa:
of the same general type. All of the work was on
i

1
1
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by one contractor. All was done for the Appellant.

There was no great break in time. All was for one
purpose - the beautification and betterment of Appellant's lot.

The Court held that project was to be determined by what was in the minds of the parties at
the outset. Yet, the Court had difficulty in holding
this was all more than one project. On page 228
of the transcript, the Court held that this was all one
projecr, and then a few pages later, held that this
was more than one project and therefore fell within
the provisions of the exception. (See page 235).
If the definition of the word "project" is to be

determined by the plan, as outlined at the outset,
the way is open for all types of circumvention by
both parties as was outlined by the court. It is the
contention of the Appellant that the determination
should be from all of the circumstances involved
m the entire transaction. All of this is clear from the
circ:ur:cstances outlined above. The type of work
should be taken into account, along with the time
and place, as well as the knowledge of the parties.
Here the circumstances point clearly to a determination that this was all one project.
The Respondent accepted the construction of
the cement block wall a short time after he began
work on the lawn. He stopped work on the lawn
and proceeded with the fence. After completing the
fence, he returned to finish the lawn. Appellant
respectively submits that this clearly shows the interrelationship of the work, as they were depen-

dent and continuous, so that they were all one pro;ect, as such the Respondent should not be allowed
to circumvent the law by claiming the exemption.
The aggregate price was almost $1,900.00, and could
not be considered casual in nature, and the cour'.
erred in so holding.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the court
erred in holding the contract enforceable, and,
further, that the circumstances are such thal the
court erred in holding this to be more thar. one
project.
WHEREFORE, we respectfully request the Hor:orable Court reverse the judgment heretofore entered by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted
THOMAS P. VUYK,
Attorney for Appellam

